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Lorenz dominance, which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the
algorithm in Dutta and Ray (1989), when exists, and the elements of the
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1 Introduction
In many societies the egalitarianism is a desirable end and is considered as
a social value. However, what ￿ egalitarianism￿means for each individual or
society can be di⁄erent. In this sense, in the context of cooperative game the-
ory the concept of egalitarianism has generated several so-called egalitarian
solutions. For example, for arbitrary cooperative games, the equal division
core (Selten, 1972), the constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray,
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11989), the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991),
the egalitarian set, the preegalitarian set and the stable egalitarian set (Arin
and Inarra, 2002) and the equal split-o⁄ set (Branzei et al., 2006).
Dutta and Ray (1989) combined the Lorenzian concept of inequality1
and the values for each coalition in a cooperative game to introduce the con-
strained egalitarian solution. They introduced the Lorenz map to select the
non Lorenz dominated allocations of a given set. Thus, using this Lorenz
map and a principle similar to that behind of the de￿nition of the equal di-
vision core (Selten, 1972), they de￿ned the Lorenz core of a game through a
recursive procedure and the result of applying the Lorenz map on the Lorenz
core is called the set of constrained egalitarian solutions which contains at
most one allocation. Likewise, Dutta and Ray (1989) provided an algorithm
to ￿nd the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games. Indeed, for gen-
eral games, when this algorithm gives an allocation in the Lorenz core then it
coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution. Based on this algorithm,
Branzei et al (2006) introduced the equal split-o⁄ set for cooperative games
which is contained in the equal division core for superadditive games and
coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games. Fur-
thermore, for convex games, the constrained egalitarian solution belongs to
the core of the game and Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the core
(Dutta and Ray, 1989).
The allocation obtained by the algorithm, when exists, does not always
coincide with the constrained egalitarian solution. In this paper we provide
some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance in cooperative games
which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm, when
exists, always Lorenz dominates every core allocation. Likewise, these results
allow to prove that every allocation in the equal split-o⁄ set also Lorenz
dominates every allocation in the core of the game. On the other hand, if
we consider that minimal requirements of an allocation are the e¢ ciency and
the individual rationality, i.e., to belong to the imputation set, then these
technical results provide insights about the structure of the less unequal
allocations in the imputation set of the game in the Lorenzian sense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
the basic de￿nitions, concepts and solutions of cooperative games used along
the paper. Section 3 is devoted to an example from Dutta and Ray (1989)
which is useful to illustrate some aspects mentioned in the Introduction.
Section 4 is the main part of the paper, where we prove some technical results
related to the Lorenz dominance. In Section 5 we conclude and discuss some
implications of the technical results with regards to cooperative games.
1See Sen (1973) for a review on economic inequality.
22 Preliminaries
A transferable utility cooperative game (TU-game in short) is de￿ned by a
pair (N;v), where N = f1;2;:::;ng is a ￿nite set of players or agents and v,
called the characteristic function, is a map from the set of all possible subsets
of N to R, such that v(;) = 0. For each coalition S, v(S) represents what
the players in S can obtain if they cooperate.
Depending on the properties of the characteristic function we have di⁄er-
ent classes of games. Two relevant classes of games are the following:
￿ Superadditive games: if v(S [ T) ￿ v(S) + v(T) for all S;T ￿ N such
that S \ T = ;.
￿ Convex games: if v(S [T)+v(S \T) ￿ v(S)+v(T) for all S;T ￿ N.
Given a game (N;v) an allocation or distribution for it is a vector x 2
Rn. We will denote by x(S) =
P
i2S xi. An allocation is called e¢ cient if
x(N) = v(N) and an allocation is called individually rational if xi ￿ v(i)
for all i 2 N. Three well-known sets of allocations for a game (N;v) are
the imputation set (I(N;v)), the core (C(N;v)) and the equal division core
(EDC(N;v)), which are de￿ned as follows:
I(N;v) = fx 2 R
n : x(N) = v(N) and xi ￿ v(i) for all i 2 Ng;
C(N;v) = fx 2 I(N;v) : x(S) ￿ v(S) for all S ￿ Ng;
EDC(N;v) = fx 2 I(N;v) : @S ￿ N;S 6= ; such that
v(S)
jSj
> xi for all i 2 Sg:
On the other hand, let (x(1);x(2);:::;x(n)) be the vector obtained from x 2
Rn by ordering its components in decreasing order: x(1) ￿ x(2) ￿ ::: ￿ x(n).









i=1 y(i) for each k = 1;2;:::;n, with at least one
strict inequality. Based in this concept we can consider two additional sets
introduced by Dutta and Ray (1989), the Lorenz core (L(N;v)) and the set
of egalitarian allocations (EL(N;v)).
The Lorenz core and the set of egalitarian allocations are de￿ned itera-
tively in the cardinality of the coalitions in the following way:
￿ Initial step: L(i;v) = fv(i)g for all i 2 N and EL(i;v) = fv(i)g for all
i 2 N.
￿ General step: L(S;v) = fx 2 RjSj : x(S) = v(S), and @T ( S and
y 2 EL(T;v) such that yi ￿ xi for all i 2 T with at least one strict
3inequalityg, where EL(T;v) = fx 2 L(T;v) : @y 2 L(T;v) such that Pk
i=1 y(i) ￿
Pk
i=1 x(i) for each k = 1;2;:::;jTj, with at least one strict
inequalityg.
The ￿nal result of the described recursive procedure are precisely L(N;v)
and EL(N;v). In Dutta and Ray (1989) it is proved that EL(N;v) contains
at most one allocation and this is called the constrained egalitarian solution
(CES(N;v)). Furthermore, Dutta and Ray (1989) provided the following
algorithm to compute the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games:
Step 1: Let S1 2 argmaxS￿N
v(S)
jSj such that jS1j > jTj for all T 2 argmaxS￿N
v(S)
jSj .
(For convex games S1 exists). De￿ne x￿
i =
v(S1)
jS1j for all i 2 S1:
Step k: Let us assume that S1;S2;:::;Sk￿1 have been de￿ned recursively
and
Sk￿1
j=1 Sj 6= N. De￿ne the game with set of player Nn
Sk￿1
j=1 Sj and














jSj . De￿ne x￿
i =
vk(Sk)
jSkj for all i 2 Sk.
This algorithm always ends in a ￿nite number of iterations, and we will
denote x￿ by DR(N;v). It is clear that for convex games DR(N;v) =
CES(N;v), but this is not true in general. Furthermore, in general, Sk could
not be unique, in that case we could obtain more than one allocation and
there would be more than one DR(N;v). Thus, in a general sense, DR(N;v)
could be considered a set of allocations.
Following the scheme of the Dutta and Ray algorithm, Branzei et al
(2006) de￿ned the equal split-o⁄ set (ESOS(N;v)). For each partition ￿ =




jSj , k = 1;2;:::;K,
they consider the allocation x￿ given by x￿
i =
vk(Sk)
jSkj for all Sk 2 ￿ and all
i 2 Sk. Given a game (N;v), the equal spli-o⁄ set is given by
ESOS(N;v) = fx 2 R
n : 9￿ such that x = x
￿g:
Clearly, in general, there are more than one partition ￿ in the described
conditions, therefore ESOS(N;v) could contain more than one allocation. In
Branzei et al (2006) it is proved that ESOS(N;v) coincides with CES(N;v)
for convex games. Finally, it is straightforward that DR(N;v) ￿ ESOS(N;v).
43 An example
In this section we are going to analyze Example 4 in Dutta and Ray (1989).
This example was used to illustrate that the egalitarian allocation does not
Lorenz dominate all core allocations when the game is not convex.
Example 1 (Dutta and Ray, 1989): N = f1;2;3;4g and the characteristic
function v is de￿ned as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23
v(S) 1 1:5 2:5 4 3 4 5 4
S 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234
v(S) 6 7 5:5 7 8 8:5 10
The constrained egalitarian allocation is CES(N;v) = (1;2;3;4) and belongs





2) which is also in the core. However, the allocation obtained
by the Dutta and Ray algorithm is DR(N;v) = (11
2;11
2;3;4) which Lorenz
dominates every core allocation. Of course, it belongs to neither the core
nor the Lorenz core. Furthermore, it is easy to check that ESOS(N;v) =
DR(N;v).
Therefore this example suggests the following questions: Does the allo-
cation obtained by the algorithm, when exists, Lorenz dominate every core
allocation? The answer is positive and one proof of that is obtained using
the technical results in the next section.
4 Technical results
In this section we provide some technical results related to Lorenz dominance
which could be useful to analyze the Lorenz dominance in cooperative games.
Let (x(1);x(2);:::;x(n)) be the vector obtained from x 2 Rn by ordering its
components in decreasing order: x(1) ￿ x(2) ￿ ::: ￿ x(n).
In the sequel, we use the following equivalent de￿nition of Lorenz domi-







for each k = 1;2;:::;n; with at least one strict inequality.
Lemma 1 The vector a = 1na Lorenz dominates each other element of the
set fx 2 Rn j
Pn
i=1 xi = na > 0g; where 1n represents the vector whose n
coordinates are equal to 1.
5Proof. Let us consider x 6= a. It is obvious that a = a(1) < x(1). Let us
assume that ka ￿
Pk
i=1 x(i). Now, we are going to prove that (k + 1)a ￿
Pk+1





i=k+2 x(i) > (n￿k￿1)a. Therefore, there exists an i￿ > k+1
such that x(i￿) > a. On the other hand, we have






x(i) = na ￿ x(k+1):
Hence, we obtain x(k+1) < a. Further, since i￿ > k + 1 implies x(k+1) ￿ x(i￿),
we have a > x(k+1) ￿ x(i￿) > a. Therefore, the result holds. ￿
Lemma 2 The vector a = 1na satis￿es (1) for each other element of the set
fx 2 Rn j
Pn
i=1 xi ￿ nag:
Proof. Let us consider x(1) ￿ x(2) ￿ ::: ￿ x(n) and de￿ne x0
(n) = x(n) ￿
(
Pn




(n) = na: Thus,
applying Lemma 1 we obtain the desired result. ￿
Proposition 1 The vector a = (1n1a1;1n2a2;:::;1ntat), such that a1 ￿ a2 ￿
::: ￿ at > 0 and
Pt














xi = ntatg: (2)
Proof. Let us consider x 6= a and the vector obtained from vector x by
rearranging in decreasing order the elements inside each block displayed in
(2): (x(1;1);:::;x(1;n1);x(2;1);:::;x(2;n2);:::;x(t;1);:::;x(t;nt)) with
x(1;1) ￿ ::: ￿ x(1;n1)
x(2;1) ￿ ::: ￿ x(2;n2)
:::
x(t;1) ￿ ::: ￿ x(t;nt):






x(i;j) for each k = 1;2;:::;ni, (3)
6and at least one inequality is strict, where x(i;j) is the j-th element in the
decreasing order within the i-th block of vector x.
Now, we are going to prove that x is Lorenz dominated by a. For each k,




























where the ￿rst inequality follows from the decreasing order inside each block,
the second inequality follows from (3) and the equality from the de￿nition
of a. Note that we use the alternative notations for ordered vectors a(￿) and
a(￿;￿); where the former refers to blocks and the latter to the elements inside
each block. Now, since x 6= a there exists a block q and an l-th coordinate




j=1 x(q;j). Take ^ k =
Pq￿1























where the strict inequality follows from (3) and the above comment.
Therefore, the result holds. ￿
Lemma 3 The vector a = (1n1a1;1n2a2;:::;1ntat), such that a1 ￿ a2 ￿ ::: ￿
at > 0 and
Pt














Proof. The proof can be derived straightforwardly taking into account
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. ￿
Proposition 2 The vector a = (1n1a1;1n2a2;:::;1ntat), where a1 ￿ a2 ￿
::: ￿ at > 0 and
Pt
























7Proof. Let us consider x 6= a. If for this vector x every inequality in (4)
is an equality, then applying Proposition 1 we obtain the result. Therefore,
let us suppose that at least one inequality in (4) is strict. In this case, there
exist r < s ￿ t such that
nr X
j=1









j=1 x(r;j) for each k = 1;:::;nr and at least one
inequality is strict (for example the last one). Let s be the ￿rst block for which Pns




obtained by arranging in decreasing order the ￿rst n1 + n2 + ::: + ns￿1 coor-





(2) ￿ ::: ￿ x
0
(n1+n2+:::+ns￿1):



























i=1 a(i); then, from the de￿ni-
tion of the set (4), we obtain
A ￿ nsas ￿
ns X
j=1
x(s;j) = B > 0:
Now, we take x(s;1), which is a largest element of block s, and distinguish
between two cases:
￿ B ￿ as ￿ x(s;1) > 0. We construct a new decreasing ordered vector x00






















































￿ x(s;1) ￿ as. The proof of this case is straightforward.
At this point, we can do the same for each other element in the s-th block
and we obtain a new decreasing ordered vector with the ￿rst n1 + n2 + ::: +
ns￿1 + ns coordinates of vector x. Repeating the reasoning for each block p
such that
Pnp
j=1 x(p;j) < npap, we can conclude that a Lorenz dominates each
other element x of the set (4). ￿
5 Some remarks on the Lorenz dominance
We shall start this section with considerations upon the constrained egali-
tarian solution. Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989) states that CES(N;v)
Lorenz dominates every allocation in C(N;v) for convex games, however, in
its proof nothing about convexity is mentioned. Therefore, one could un-
derstand that this result is also true in other situations. Furthermore, a
￿ rich-to-poor￿transfer reasoning is used for proving that CES(N;v) Lorenz
dominated every allocation in C(N;v). In our opinion, this ￿ rich-to-poor￿
reasoning, although intuitively clear, is little precise from a mathematical
point of view.
Next using the technical results in Section 4, we provide an alternative
and more general proof for Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989).
9Theorem 1 In a balanced game, if DR(N;v) is univocally de￿ned, then
DR(N;v) Lorenz dominates every allocation in C(N;v).
Proof. Let x 2 C(N;v) such that x 6= DR(N;v). Since for all k = 1;2;:::;K,
x(Sk) ￿ v(Sk), two cases are possible:
￿ x(Sk) = v(Sk) for all k = 1;2;:::;K. Then, it is easy to check that
we are in the conditions of Proposition 1; hence, DR(N;v) Lorenz
dominates x.
￿ x(Sk) > v(Sk) for some k = 1;2;:::;K. Then it is easy to check that
we are in the conditions of Proposition 2; hence, DR(N;v) Lorenz
dominates x.
Therefore, the proof is ￿nished.
Corollary 2 (Theorem 3, Dutta and Ray, 1989) In a convex game, CES(N;v)
Lorenz dominates every other allocation in C(N;v).
Proof. It is straightforward taking into account that in convex games
CES(N;v) = DR(N;v) and Theorem 1.
These results can be easily extended to ESOS(N;v) as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 3 In a balanced game, every allocation in ESOS(N;v) Lorenz
dominates every allocation in C(N;v).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
On the other hand, in superadditive games we have that DR(N;v) ￿
ESOS(N;v) ￿ EDC(N;v) ￿ I(N;v). Thus, if a society believes that a
￿ fair￿allocation should be in the imputation set and the Lorenz criterion is
a good concept of inequality, then the core would be in trouble many times.
If the coalitional rationality is included as other desirable criterion, then the
ideas and results in Arin and Inarra (2001) would be very useful.
A simple algorithm to obtain an allocation in the imputation set which
Lorenz dominates each other allocation in the imputation set is the following:
Step 1: Let S1 = fi 2 N : v(i) ￿
v(N)
jNj g. If S1 6= ; then de￿ne x￿
i = v(i) for
all i 2 S1, otherwise x￿
i =
v(N)
jNj for all i 2 N.
10Step k: Let us assume that S1;S2;:::;Sk￿1 have been de￿ned recursively and
Sk￿1
j=1 Sj 6= N. Let Sk = fi 2 Nn
Sk￿1










If Sk 6= ; then de￿ne x￿
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